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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VERBATIM RECORDING OF
PROCEEDINGS IN AMERICAN ADJUDICATION*
DAVID W. LouISELL** AND MAYNARD E. PIRSIG***
The practice in American courts of making a verbatim record
of the proceedings affords an interesting illustration of how a pro-
cedural technique, which when superficially viewed seems to pertain
merely to mechanical routine, can exert a vital and even dominating
influence on the formulation of the philosophy of adjudication as
well as on day-by-day judicial administration. It is our thesis that
the practice of recording verbatim exerts a profound influence on
the conduct of the trial, whether by court alone or by court and
jury; the relationships between the trial judge and participating
counsel; the procedures for review of the trial by the trial judge;
and appellate review, including the feasibility of seeking such re-
view and the nature, scope and potential achievements thereof.
Indeed, verbatim recording is a dominant reason for the extensive
review of the facts available in American appellate procedure.
The full strength of the influence of verbatim recording is probably
*This paper has been prepared for delivery at the International Congress
of Comparative Law to be held in Paris, August 1-8, 1954, under the auspices
of the Academie Internationale de droit Compare. It is here published by
permission of the American Organizing Committee for the Congress. The
subject was suggested by the interest of European lawyers in the American
practice of verbatim recording of trial proceedings. In at least some of the
European countries such recording seems to be unknown. Only in recent
years has English practice made provision for official shorthand notes of trials.
R.S.C., Order 66a, r. 2, effective August 21, 1940, as quoted in Burnand, Dia-
mond and Burnett-Hall, The Annual Practice 1953 1523 (70th ed.), providesin part:
"In every action, summons and motion tried or heard with witnesses
in the Chancery Division or the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court
or at Assizes an official shorthand note shall, unless the Judge otherwise
directs, be taken of any evidence given orally in Court and of any summing-
up by the Judge and of any judgment delivered by the Judge, and, if any
party so requires, the note so taken shall be transcribed and such transcripts
as any party may demand shall be supplied at the charges authorized by
the scheme."
It will be noted that this rule does not include statements of counsel, and
that the Judge may direct that no shorthand note be taken. Moreover, even
where a trial is officially reported, apparently the Judge may preclude use of
the shorthand reporter's transcript in the Court of Appeal by intimating that
the Judge's own note is sufficient. R.S.C., Order 58, r. 11, Burnand et al., szapra
at 1268-1269. Depositions taken under the English rules are recorded "not
ordinarily by question and answer, but so as to represent as nearly as may
be the statement of the witness." R.S.C., Order 37, r. 12, Burnand et al., supra
at 653. The authors do not know to what extent official shorthand reporting
under Order 66a, r. 2 supra, has actually superseded the English practice, still
prevalent in the 1930's, whereby the trial judge made copious notes of the
evidence, in the absence of an official reporter.
**Professor of Law. University of Minnesota. Member, Minnesota, New
York and District of Columbia Bars.
***Dean of the Law School, University of Minnesota.
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not realized by American judges or lawyers, and certainly has not
been much articulated. As with so many of the postulates of judicial
administration, it has been assumed implicitly rather than analyzed
and explicated. It is our purpose to show the strength of this influ-
ence, and to the extent space permits appraise its value and inquire
into its current tendencies.
It will be well first to point out the universality in American
federal and state courts of general jurisdiction, that is courts com-
petent to adjudicate important civil and criminal cases, of the prac-
tice of verbatim recording. Such courts have attached to them a
reporter whose function generally is to effect a verbatim recording
in shorthand of everything said during the course of the proceedings
in open court, as well as remarks between court and counsel out of
hearing of the general public and the jury. Often the duties of
these reporters are specifically set forth by statute." The federal
statute which requires a reporter for each of the District Courts of
the United States is fairly typical. 2 While there is variation from
place to place in the prescription of specific duties for reporters,
their primary duty everywhere is to record all of the testimony,
whether given on direct or cross-examination or examination by the
court, every objection made, the ruling thereon and exception
taken when exceptions are necessary, and all remarks of the court,
counsel and other participants. Practice differs as to the recording
of counsel's opening statement and closing summation, but generally
1. Representative state statutes are: Ala. Code fit. 13, § 261 et seq.
(1940) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 29.01 (1941) ; Minn. Stat. § 486.01 et seq.(1949) ; N. Y. Jud. Law art. 9; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 105 et seq., as
amended April 13, 1953; Tex. Stat., Rev. Civ. art. 2321 et seg. (1948). SeePound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases 360 (1941). Section 108 of the
Oklahoma statute as amended April 13, 1953 will be quoted as generally
illustrative. It contains provisions which will be commented on later in thispaper:
"It shall be the duty of the official court reporter to take down in
shorthand, stenotype, or such other method as may be approved by the
court and agreed to by all parties, and to correctly transcribe, when re-
quired, all the proceedings upon the trial of any cause, as well as all state-
ments of counsel, the witnesses or the court, made during the trial of
any cause or with reference to any cause pending for trial, when required
by a party or attorney interested therein, and all other matters that might
properly be a part of a case-made for appeal or proceeding in error. An
attorney in any case pending shall have the right to request of the court
or the official court reporter that all such statements or proceedings
occurring in the presence of the official court reporter, or when his pres-
ence is required by such attorney, shall be taken and transcribed. A refusal
of the court to permit, or, when requested, to require any statement to be
taken down by the official court reporter, or transcribed after being taken
down, upon the same being shown by affidavit or other direct and com-
petent evidence, to the Supreme Court, shall be deemed prejudicial error,
without regard to the merits therof."
2. 28 U. S. C. § 753 (1946).
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these too are recorded verbatim upon order of the court or request
of either party.3 In summary, therefore, when the court or either
party desires it, there is recorded every work spoken during the
course of the proceedings.
Customarily the recording process is the taking of shorthand
notes by the reporter. He is necessarily an expert highly qualified
for rapid recording and translation of his notes into words, that
is, an expert in the stenographic arts. He is under oath faithfully to
perform the duties of his office. He is paid a salary for acting as
reporter, which is often supplemented by income earned when he is
called upon to transcribe his notes into typwritten manuscript form,
or transcript, upon request of any interested party. He is under
obligation to attach a certificate of correctness to his original short-
hand notes, which are preserved in the custody of the court for a
specified time. When called upon to make a transcript, he is under
obligation to attach to it a similar certificate. He is subject not only
to the legal sanctions implicit in his oath but to sanctions imposed
by professional standards of integrity and competence. 4
While the reporter as one of the officers of the tribunal is sub-
ject generally to the direction of the court, the performance of his
essential duties cannot be curtailed by the court. Thus, a trial court
has no authority to direct the court reporter ". . . to disregard his
sworn statutory duty to take down all rulings and exceptions."' 5 In
other words, the right of each party to have made a word for word
record of everything said cannot be negated by the trial court. Even
before the trial begins, depositions taken for use at the trial or dis-
covery purposes will normally be recorded verbatim in American
practice.'3 Verbatim recording of formal hearings before American
administrative agencies and Congressional committees is also the
rule.7
3. Goldberg v. Mlutual Life Ins. Co., 24 N. Y. S. 2d 929 (1940), rev'd on
other grounds, 263 App. Div. 10, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 154 (1st Dep't 1941), appeal
dismissed, 288 N. Y. 662, 43 N. E. 2d 69 (1942) ; see Jovaag v. O'Donnell,
189 Minn. 315, 318, 249 N. W. 676, 677 (1933).
4. For representative statutory provisions, see note 1 supra. Court re-
porters customarily develop and manifest a spirit of professional pride in the
accuracy and integrity of their work.
5. Weber v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 152 N. Y. Supp. 197, 199
(App. Term, 1st Dep't 1915). Note the stringent sanction against the trial
court's interference with the making of a verbatim record provided by the
Oklahoma statute quoted in note 1 supra. In Keady v. Owers, 30 Colo. 1,
7, 69 Pac. 509, 511 (1902), the Supreme Court of Colorado, in ordering by
mandamus a court reporter to furnish a transcript to an interested party, said:
"The order of the judge of the [trial] court not to furnish it is no excuse
or justification whatever."
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c).
7. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 7(d), 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C.
§ 1006(d) (1946)., Even in labor arbitration proceedings, which are private
1953]
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The attitude of the Bench and Bar respecting the reliability of
the verbatim record made by the court reporter is well summarized
in State v. Perkins :"
".... The foregoing provisions of the statutes are referred to
for the purpose of showing the faith and credit which are to be
given to the shorthand reporter's notes by legislative enactments.
It is true that in some instances the notes may not be used until
they have been certified to be correct, but notwithstanding this
the general trend of the enactments is to recognize the correct-
ness of the notes of the shorthand reporter, and aside from this
lawyers and judges of experience know that such notes contain,
with few exceptions, the testimony of witnesses as it was given,
and are thoroughly reliable .... The testimony is reported so
that it may become a part of the permanent record, and thus
assist in the administration of justice in both civil and criminal
.cases. The lawyers depend upon the report in the future progress
of the case, and a translation thereof furnishes this court its only
means of determining disputed questions as to the record."
The confidence of Bench and Bar in the verbatim record is
crystallized in the federal statute providing that such record is to
be deemed prima facie correct.9 Moreover, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide that whenever the testimony of a witness
at a trial or hearing which was stenographically reported is ad-
missible in evidence at a later trial, it may be proved by the tran-
script thereof duly certified by the person who reported the testi-
mony.10
The significance attributed to the verbatim record is perhaps
best illustrated by cases where the party who lost in the trial court
is granted a new trial because of his inability to obtain a verbatim
record caused by the death of the reporter or the inability for any
reason of the reporter, or of a substitute for him, to make a tran-
script from the reporter's notes. It is of course recognized that im-
position of a new trial upon the prevailing party is an unfortunate
hardship for him; but in the words of the Massachusetts Court:
and as to which economy is often an important consideration, there appears to
be an increasing tendency for the parties to agree upon hiring a reporter to
make a verbatim record. Lord Brougham in his famous speech of 1828 called
for verbatim reporting in all nisi prius courts. He pointed out, inter alia, that
a judge could give better consideration to a case if he were relieved of
the mechanical task of taking notes. 2 Speeches of Lord Brougham 465-466
(1838).
8. 143 Iowa 55, 57-58, 120 N. W. 62, 63-64 (1909). See also Harris v.
State, 23 Wyo. 487, 494-496, 153 Pac. 881, 882-883 (1916).
9. 28 U. S. C. § 753(b) (1946).
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 80(c). However, use of the transcript is not the ex-
clusive method of showing the previous testimony. Any person who heard the
testimony and recollects it is competent to testify to it. 4 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1330 (3d ed. 1940).
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". to deprive the defendant of [the right to bring a case to the
appellate court on all the evidence] because of an event for which
he was in no wise responsible would be manifestly unjust. That
a hardship is imposed on the plaintiffs in requiring them to
undergo the burden and expense of a second trial after a decree
in their favor cannot be gainsaid. But the hardship is less than
that which the defendant would suffer if it were to be deprived
of its full day in court.""
The consequences of making verbatim records and of the signifi-
cance accorded them by Bench and Bar, are many and profound.
They go to the philosophic roots of judicial administration in the
United States. They are daily exemplified in the trial courtroom in
techniques and procedures and the inter-relationships between
judges and counsel. Their greatest impact, however, is on American
appellate practice and procedure. It is hardly an exaggeration to
say that the verbatim record has been a dominant influence in
making the appellate process a cornerstone of American adjudica-
tion. Brief consideration will show, we think, that the verbatim
record's potential is not based alone upon legal sanctions, but as
well upon custom, tradition and psychological factors.
I. VERBATImI RECORDING AND TRIAL TECHNIQUES
As a consequence of verbatim reporting each participant in the
trial speaks with full realization that everything he says is being
recorded exactly as he says it and that, depending on the future
developments of the litigation, the recorded notes may be tran-
scribed into a permanent word record. Even if at the time of the
trial the prospects are that there will be no appeal and hence no
occasion for the court reporter to transcribe his notes, there is
always the possibility that a transcript will be made; in any event,
the notes are available for transcription as the occasion may demand.
The psychological impact of verbatim recording upon counsel is
potent. The trial lawyer gauges his presentation not only for the
trial tribunal, but potentially for the ultimate tribunal, whose con-
sideration of the facts in the event of an appeal will be limited to the
record made in the trial court. Thus the case is tried not only for
the elusive moment, but for the permanent record. The arguments,
concessions and admissions made and the positions taken by
counsel are made and taken with the realization that they will
appear in the record as specific, definite and certain, and that at-
tempted retreat from them will normally appear as a retreat, a
11. Brooks v. National Shawmut Bank, 323 Mass. 677, 681, 84 N. E. 2d
318, 321 (1949). For a discussion of this problem, see Note, 19 A. L. R. 2d
1098 (1951).
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change of front. There will be little occasion for prolonged dispute
as to what counsel has said; the reporter can be asked to read a
disputed statement, and the dispute quickly put to rest. Similarly,
all of the testimony adduced is permanently and exactly recorded.
Of course it is always possible for a witness to claim that he did
not comprehend an earlier question, and thus attempt to escape
the consequences of his answer. But such escape hatches are nar-
rowed and circumscribed by potential confrontation of the witness
with the exact earlier question and his reply to it. This has im-
portant results in respect of cross-examination and impeachment.
The mistaken or deliberately false witness can be confronted on
cross-examination with exactly what he said on direct examination.
If one witness is contradicted by another, exactly what each said is
potentially available.
The rulings of the court are recorded with similar exactness
which enables counsel to gauge his further presentation in the con-
fidence that all the judge's previous conduct during the trial can
be summoned forth to test its consistency with his subsequent
conduct. While in theory the trial judge is the master of the rec-
ord and may correct errors of the reporter, rare is the occasion
for the trial judge to dispute the reporter's recording, so con-
fident is Bench and Bar in the accuracy of that process. Thus,
if the trial judge changes his ruling on the admissibility or exclusion
of any item of evidence, the fact of that change will appear of record.
Of course it is true that the judge's manner or demeanor in speaking
-those subtle nuances that can be conveyed by tone of voice or
attitude of expression and which may be important to jurors-are
in the nature of things not concomitantly recorded with the spoken
word. This is one reason for the suggestion that trials be also
recorded as talking movies.12 We will later take note of the progress
of recommendations for mechanical recording which, generally, is
still in an experimental stage. For present purposes it will suffice to
note that it is not unknown for counsel, faced with a trial judge
guilty of prejudicial conduct by attitude, demeanor or tone of voice,
to have the reporter note in the record the physical manifestations
of such judicial conduct.
The realization of permanence and definiteness engendered by
verbatim reporting conduces to deliberateness and formality on the
part of the trial lawyer. He cannot afford to be careless or casual
or trust to the vagaries of human recollection to exculpate him from
verbal errors. Even when he finds that he has misspoken and must
12. See Frank, Courts on Trial 224 (1949).
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request that an erroneous remark be stricken from the record,
the erroneous remark, the request for correction, and the corrected
remark, usually are all physically preserved. The trial lawyer, there-
fore, customarily approaches his task with the philosophy of trying
his case, not only to the tribunal, but "to the record" as well. Indeed,
there is a considerable literature concerning the trial lawyer's prob-
lem of striking a proper balance between emphasis on convincing
the trial tribunal and winning his case there, on the one hand, and
making a strong record for possible appeal, on the other.3'
Implicit acknowledgment that verbatim recording conduces to
formality at the trial is found in the attitude of certain judges that
such recording should be avoided at pre-trial conferences. These are
conferences before trial between a judge and the opposing counsel in
a lawsuit for the purpose of simplifying the issues to be tried. The
systematized use of pre-trial conferences is relatively new in
American adjudication. The provision for them in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure of 1938'4 gave impetus to this innovation in the
United States, and now they are frequent and increasing phenomena
in American practice.' 5 The objectives of pre-trial are the simplifica-
tion of the issues to be tried, amendments of the pleadings when
necessary or desirable, obtaining admissions of facts and documents,
limitation of the number of expert witnesses, and the elimination
of frivolous or insubstantial issues. Some judges are known to
favor pre-trial conferences in chambers rather than in open court,
and without verbatim recording, on the ground that free discussion
and the spirit of conciliation and compromise are promoted by the
absence of formality which accompanies the making of a verbatim
record. Whether or not this attitude toward pre-trial conferences is
sound, it has no necessary derogatory connotation respecting the
value of verbatim recording of trials. The pre-trial conference is
essentially what its name implies, a conference, and hence is properly
concerned with concessions and to a degree at least, with concilia-
tion, whereas a trial's objectives are the accurate ascertainment of
the facts and the application to them of objective standards; in a
word, adjudication. While verbatim recording may sometimes
13. See, e.g., Tracy, The Successful Practice of Law 202 et seq. (1947).
Cutler, Successful Trial Tactics 206 et seq. (1949).
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
15. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1f 16.06 (2d ed. 1948) ; Louisell,
Discovcry and Pre-Trial, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 633, 660 (1952) ; Wright, Modern
Pleadinkq and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 909, 931-932;
Laws, Pre-Trial-Its Purposes and Potentialities, 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1
(1952); Sarpy, Pre-Trial in Lout'mian, 6 Loyola L. Rev. 105 (1952); Van-
derbilt, Cases and Materials on Modern Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion 645 ct seq. (1952).
1953]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
promote an attitude of undue formality by counsel, on the whole we
believe that its influence on the conduct of counsel is wholesome in
an adversary proceeding. When trial is reached, conciliation as an
objective is necessarily subordinate to the requirements of adjudi-
cation. Verbatim recording tends to induce counsel to be precise,
thorough and careful; it restrains the impetuous; it spurs on the
laggard; it casts over all a sense of responsibility engendered by the
psychology of "making a record."
Verbatim recording has certain collateral advantages for coun-
sel which we have not mentioned. Probably the chief one is that it is
often possible for the trial lawyer to arrange with the reporter to
transcribe his notes after the close of each day's session and furnish
the day's transcript to the lawyer prior to the commencement of the
next day's session. Thus the trial lawyer may have at his elbow
a running record, so to speak, of all of the previous sessions. This
is of inestimable value not only to counsel but also to the trial
court, whose recollection can be refreshed quickly by reference to
the appropriate page of the transcript. Of course such procurement
of the transcript assumes a party financially able and willing to pay
the reporter for transcribing his notes because the reporter's offi-
cially paid salary embraces only the duty of recording the notes, not
ordinarily of transcribing them as well. Therefore such day by day
procurement of the verbatim transcript is customary only in litiga-
tion involving substantial sums and parties able to bear the burden,
or litigation where an appeal is practically inevitable and where
procurement of the transcript will in any event be necessary for
appellate purposes, or important criminal cases where the prosecutor
feels justified in incurring the expense of the daily transcript as a
burden on the public treasury. We will later discuss the economic
factors in verbatim reporting.
H. VERBATM RECORDING AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIALS
In American practice the losing party has the right to make the
claim before the trial tribunal that it erred either in ascertaining
the facts or in applying the law. The usual method of making this
claim is by motion to the trial judge, within a specified time after
decision, for a new trial, whether the case was heard by judge and
jury or by judge alone, although in the latter event an alternative
and less radical method is by motion for amended findings of fact
and conclusions of law.'16 The motion for a new trial is a common
16. Illustrative of modern American practice is Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b)
which provides in part: "Upon motion of a party made not later than ten
days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make
additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly."
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device to test the accuracy of the trial's adjudication. It is some-
times made in the genuine expectancy or at least hope that the trial
court will be persuaded to acknowledge error, and sometimes as a
prudent if not indispensable preliminary to an appeal. In modem
American practice new trials can be granted on any or some of the
issues without being granted as to all the issues.17 Whether a new
trial is granted in whole or in part, so much of the first trial's
conclusion as is condemned by the order for a new trial is obviated,
and the results of the new trial supersede it.
There are two principal types of motions for a new trial,"'
namely, (1) motions made on the minutes of the court, and (2)
motions made on a so-called settled case. A settled case is the re-
porter's verbatim transcript of the trial, approved as correct by
the trial judge.'0 WVhich method the losing counsel will use in a given
cause depends on a variety of attending circumstances, including the
type of question urged, economic factors and the likelihood of an
appeal if the motion is unsuccessful. A motion made on the minutes
of the court relies essentially on the trial judge's recollection of the
incidences of the trial, and thus avoids the expense of procuring a
transcript from the court reporter. If the reason urged for a new
trial is a question of law separable from the trial's mass of evidence,
as for example a ruling that a particular person was a competent
witness, or that a particular measure of damages was the correct
one, the probability is that moving counsel will think it adequate
to move on the minutes of the court. On the other hand, if the chal-
lenge to the decision is that it is not sustainable by the evidence,
thus involving an appraisal of the testimony given at the trial, a
motion on a settled case is in order, if the moving party can afford it.
If it appears reasonably certain to the moving counsel that he will
have to appeal the case and therefore will later need the transcript,
he may decide to get it for purposes of his motion for a new trial,
even though except for the probable appeal he would be content to
predicate the motion on the judge's minutes.
Thus the significance of the verbatim record on motions for
a new trial depends on the kind of motion used. The verbatim
17. Typical of modem American practice is Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) which
provides in part: "A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and
on all or part of the issues ......
18. We omit consideration of motions based upon grounds which do not
appear of record, that is, which are not normally exposed by the trial pro-
ceedings, e.g., the ground of newly discovered material evidence. The usual
method of establishing such a ground is by affidavit.
19. See, e.g., Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.07. Sometimes approval by the judge
is dispensed with, except where necessary to settle specific disputes between
counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 75(h).
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record is of compelling significance when the motion is made on a
settled case. The entire trial is spread before court and counsel
for possible argument and appraisal of each significant item of evi-
dence. Where the motion is on the minutes of the court, the bearing
of the verbatim record is less direct, but nevertheless important.
Portions of it may be transcribed as needed; in any event, it is all
potentially available, and this potentiality naturally acts as a check
on unwarranted assertions by counsel as to what the record con-
tains. If the trial judge in considering the motion for a new trial
finds that he reaches an impasse because of doubt as to what a wit-
ness said, he may have the reporter read to him, or transcribe
for him, the pertinent testimony. Therefore even motions techni-
cally made on the minutes of the court realistically are based on the
ultimate availability of the verbatim record.
The verbatim record's function of making possible and facilitat-
ing a broad scope of appraisal of what took place in the trial court,
will be considered in more detail in the discussion of appeals.
III. VERBATIM RECORDING AS A SANCTION ON THE TRIAL JUDGE
Many of our observations under this point are implicit in what
has already been said. By reason of verbatim recording the Ameri-
can trial judge, no less than the advocate, is psychologically aware
that he is creating a definite and permanent record. Every ruling
that he makes, every word that he pronounces, whether in inter-
rogating a witness, deciding for or against admissibility of evidence,
restricting, reprimanding or otherwise conversing with counsel, or
instructing the jury, is subject to potential appraisal by an appellate
court. Therefore he stands, in relation to the appellate court, much
in the position that the attorneys before him stand in relation to
him, subject to control and censure. He stands, in a word, not as the
arbitrary master, but almost as the servant, of the record. In this,
the verbatim record is an enemy of capriciousness; in this, it serves
the ideal of the supremacy of law.
Not all of the verbatim record's sanctions on trial judges con-
stitute legal or formal restrictions. The trial judge is aware that if an
appeal is taken and in consequence a transcript of the trial made, it
will be appraised not only by the appellate judges, but copies of it
will be distributed to bar and school libraries throughout his juris-
diction, there to be kept permanently available for the perusal by his
fellow judges, lawyers, and scholars. Thus there will always remain
at least the possibility of exposing error, shoddy intellectual perform-
ance, or dereliction in carrying out judicial duties. In those states
(Vol. 38:29
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where, by reason of the democratic tradition or perhaps a perversion
of it, undue emphasis has been placed on popular election of judges,
sometimes in the opinion of some observers20 with the unfortunate
result of obtaining mediocre trial judges, the need for the sanctions
afforded by the verbatim record is correspondingly great.
IV. TIiE VERBATIM RECORD AND APPEALS
But the most important consequences of verbatim recording con-
cern appeals and appellate processes. American appellate courts, like
trial courts, must base their conclusions as to the facts only on
evidence introduced at the trial, except for facts within the doctrine
of judicial notice. 21 The introduction of new evidence during truly
appellate stages of litigation is not a normal part of American prac-
tice.2 2 Therefore the case is won or lost on appeal on the verbatim
record made in the trial court. In fact, the potential appeal of the
adjudication of each trial court is the principal reason for making a
verbatim record, as observed in Keady v. Owers :23
"Indeed, the chief object of having this done [i.e., making a ver-
batim record] is not for the benefit of the trial court, but that, in
case of a review of the judgment, a full and complete record of
the proceedings may be written out to be laid before the appel-
late tribunal."
Adequate appraisal of the significance of the verbatim record
in appellate procedure requires at least an outline of the history of
American appellate practice. Before the merger of law and equity,
20. See Pirsig, Cases on Judicial Administration 675 et seq. (1946).
Joughin and Morgan, The Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti (1948) affords a
good illustration of how the verbatim record facilitates a profound analysis of
the conduct of a trial, including the performance of the trial judge, and thus
imposes on trial judges a significant psychological and moral sanction.
21. Sometimes in American practice a case is transferred from a court
of limited jurisdiction, e.g., a probate court, which is often without the services
of a court reporter, to a higher trial court, where a new trial is had, and the
transfer is called an appeal. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 525.71, 525.72 (1949).
But lawyers in modem American practice usually think of "appeal" as con-
noting review by a higher court of a record made in a lower court, rather
than a new trial in the higher court. Thus the word "appeal" is ambiguous.
Cf. State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 244, 32 N. W.
2d 574, 578 (1948). It is noteworthy that usually transfer of a case, wherein
a verbatim record has not been made, to a higher court results in a new trial
in the higher court; appeal where a verbatim record has been made results in
a wholly different kind of consideration in the higher court, namely, an
examination of the record to ascertain whether there was error. For a suc-
cinct outline of the steps in American appellate procedure, see Morgan, The
Study of Law 72-74 (2d ed. 1948).
22. One of the outstanding American scholars regards the limitation of
appellate courts to the record made in the trial court, to the preclusion of new
evidence in the appellate courts, as a misfortune in American appellate prac-
tice. See Pound, Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases 387 (1941).
23. 30 Colo. 1, 6, 69 Pac. 509, 511 (1902).
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review by an appellate court in an equity suit differed substantially
from such review in a suit at law. In an equity suit, the case was
tried before the chancellor on written evidence, and on review it was
feasible to send to the appellate court the identical written evidence
which had been presented to the chancellor. In suits at law, how-
ever, the evidence was taken orally in open court and, prior to the
time of verbatim recording, the only feasible way of presenting
issues for review by the appellate court was to reconstruct in some
manner those incidences of the trial of which review was sought.
The technique developed for such reconstruction was the Bill of
Exceptions. This is a statement of the proceedings reconstructed
from the notes of the trial judge, counsel, other participants in the
trial, and sometimes bystanders, approved as correct by the trial
judge.2 4 Under this procedure appellate courts got the evidence
second-hand, and were handicapped in appraising its reliability as
compared with the trial tribunal who heard the witnesses testify
orally. A much broader scope of appellate review prevailed in
equity appeals as compared with appeals in suits at law. 2
The practice of making a verbatim record, however, renders
obsolescent such indirect methods of reconstructing the trial pro-
ceedings as the Bill of Exceptions. An order to the court reporter to
transcribe his notes produces a verbatim transcript in lieu of a
mere summary of the testimony stated according to recollection.
While the Bill of Exceptions remains available in some places as an
alternative to use of the verbatim transcript,26 modern American
appellate practice normally contemplates the use of the verbatim
transcript, or the relevant portions thereof, as a basis for review of
the trial proceedings. This does not mean that the evidence is always
presented to the appellate court as transcribed by the reporter in
question and answer form. While this is the preferred and most
frequently used method, in some places counsel have the option of
24. See Miller v. United States, 317 U. S. 192, 198 (1942) : "Historically
a bill of exceptions does not embody a verbatim transcript of the evidence
but, on the contrary, a statement with respect to the evidence adequate to
present the contentions made in the appellate court. Such a bill may be pre-
pared from notes kept by counsel, from the judge's notes, from the recollec-
tion of witnesses as to what occurred at the trial, and, in short, from any
and all sources which will contribute to a veracious account of the trial judge's
action and the basis on which his ruling was invoked."
25. See Pound, op. cit. supra note 22, at 300 et seq. U. S. Const. Amend.
VII, provides in part ". . . no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law."
26. Even under the most modem American appellate practice, provision
is made for what is essentially a Bill of Exceptions in cases where no steno-
graphic report of the proceedings was made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 75(n).
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reducing the testimony to narrative form, and in a few places it is
required that they do so.27 However, even where the testimony is
reduced to narrative form, the verbatim transcript is available
as the norm of accuracy by which to measure the narration, and the
narration is the product of agreement of opposing counsel. 28
What are the practical consequences of verbatim records on
appeals? In the first place, the right of the losing party to obtain
a record shaped not by the recollections of the judge who has decided
against him but by the indifferent pen of the ever-recording reporter,
may cause counsel to think an appeal worthwhile which otherwise
he might deem hopeless. Secondly, the verbatim record makes prac-
ticable, as well as theoretically possible, a comprehensive scope of
review. It is the verbatim record which makes feasible the exten-
sive review of the facts common in American appellate practice to
ascertain whether the evidence reasonably sustains the decision
of the trial tribunal. It is perhaps easy enough without a verbatim
transcript to present to an appellate court a naked legal question
such as the proper construction of a statute or written contract.
But when the issue is whether the evidence reasonably sustains the
decision, an appellate court naturally is reluctant to hold the trial
tribunal unreasonable unless the appellate court has means of ap-
praisal at least roughly equivalent to those of the trial court. While
the verbatim transcript cannot perfectly equate the appellate court's
and trial tribunal's capacities to appraise the facts since the appellate
judges do not observe the manner of oral testimony, it does provide
the requisite rough equivalence.
It is necessary to note the wide variance in viewpoint among
American jurisdictions as to the extent of reviewability of the facts
on appeal. Despite the assimilation of law and equity cases into
one form of civil action, remnants of historical differences still affect
the scope of factual review on appeal. In federal practice, the con-
stitutional command persists that "no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law." 2 In equity cases, often a
27. See Vanderbilt, Cases and Materials on Modern Procedure and
Judicial Administration 1081-1084 (1952). Apparently only one federal
appellate court, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, requires
that the pertinent evidence be reduced to narrative form. See Rule 10(b) of
the Rules of that Court, as amended January 1, 1951.
28. For an exhaustive comparison of nineteenth-century appellate pro-
cedure with modem appellate procedure in the United States, see Pound,
op. cit. supra note 22, c. 4 and c. 5.
29. See note 25 supra.
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more comprehensive scope of review of the facts is available, some-
times amounting to de novo consideration. Further, there is varia-
tion as to whether appeals in cases triable by jury but wherein a
jury is waived, should have the type of review of equity cases or
jury-tried cases, and whether in court-tried cases the scope of review
is more comprehensive in respect of documentary than oral evi-
dence.30 Generally, however, it may be stated that the trial tribunal's
decision of the facts, whether by verdict of a jury or findings of a
judge, can be examined by the appellate court at least to the extent
of determining whether the evidence reasonably sustains the decision.
In numerous cases this is the only question presented on appeal. In
deciding this question which is often determinative of the appeal, the
appellate court is able to measure the contentions of each party by
the verbatim record before it.
It is true that American appellate courts, in varying terms,
often deprecate the taking of appeals on factual questions. The
bar is often reminded that verdicts and findings below are presump-
tively correct and will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous; that
the trial court and not the appellate court is the place to resolve
factual differences; that the appellate court must not substitute its
judgment on the facts merely because it differs from the trial court;
that the only factual question proper on appeal is whether reasonable
minds could reach the trial tribunal's decision on the evidence. But
despite these oft-repeated generalities, the reality is that where an
appellate court is convinced that the factual determination of the
trial tribunal is erroneous, it will often convert that conviction into
a holding of essential unreasonableness. Thus every losing party,
fortified with a verbatim record, tends to indulge the hope that he
can convince the appellate court that the trial tribunal was unreason-
able. Therefore in a certain sense the American appellate court,
normally isolated from the evidence-taking function and dependent
for its grist on what has taken place elsewhere, is nonetheless con-
verted into another trial forum. In a real sense, therefore, the ver-
batim record has done much to make American judicial administra-
tion largely a matter of appellate adjudication.
30. As illustrative of the multiplicity of considerations that affect the
extent of appellate reviews of the facts, see Kansas Pacific Ry. v. Kunkel,
17 Kan. 145 (1876) ; Peterson v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 106 Minn. 245,
118 N. W. 1016 (1908) ; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474 (1935) ; United
States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 394-395 (1948) ; Orvis v. Higgins, 180
F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 810 (1950) ; 5 Moore, Fed-
eral Practice ff 52.01 et. seq. (2d ed. 1948) ; Clark, Special Problems in Draft-
ing and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 505-
506 (1950).
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The consequences are profound. From the parties' viewpoint,
we think it no exaggeration to state that behind the American
trial lawyer's conception of the trial court lurks the possibility of
limiting, checking and controlling that court by a possible appeal.
On the other hand, substantial burdens are imposed on appellate
judges beyond the task of ascertaining and explicating the applicable
rule of law. The appellate judges must carefully appraise the record
made in the trial court. When a factual question is raised on appeal,
the appellate judges normally have to study the pertinent testimony,
or at least those portions to which attention is directed by counsel.
This may involve reading hundreds or even thousands of pages of
recorded testimony. The resulting appellate opinion is often pri-
marily concerned with an analysis of the facts. While such an
opinion may have scant value as a precedent, the factual analysis
entailed in preparing it affords a significant safeguard against arbi-
trariness by the appellate court as well as by the trial court.
Perhaps the most pertinent generalization of the verbatim rec-
ord's significance on appeal is that it provides another manifesta-
tion of the American distrust of concentration of power. It is not
surprising to find in a constitutional system which emphasizes the
judiciary as a check upon the arbitrary exertion of executive and
legislative powers, such correlative restraints upon the judiciary
itself as are implicit in the verbatim record.
V. THE COSTS OF VERBATIm RECORDING
The American lawyer is aware that the values of the verbatim
record are had only at a price. One price is the tendency toward
prolongation of litigation, because the verbatim record doubtless
encourages appeals. But there is also a price in the more literal
sense, for frequently the procurement and printing of the verbatim
record is costly for the appealing party. Commonly court rules re-
quire that a specified number of the transcript be printed for use
of the appellate judges and later distribution to bar and school
libraries. If the trial has been a lengthy one, the court reporter's and
printer's charges for transcribing and printing the record may
amount to hundreds, even thousands, of dollars. Therefore there is
sometimes a disturbing contrast between the brand of justice avail-
able for those able to pay for its contrivances, and those unable to
pay. This contrast is odious in a society which idealizes equality
before the law. The administration of criminal justice particularly
emphasizes the need for ameliorative measures, already largely ac-
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complished in federal practice, for those unable to pay for tran-
scripts.3 ' In the field of civil adjudication attention has recently
been called to the substantial decrease in the number of appeals
apparently attributable primarily to the cost of mechanically process-
ing the appeals, that is, obtaining the transcript from the reporter,
and having the requisite number of copies printed for the appellate
court.
3 2
However, factors should be noted which tend to minimize the
significance of economic disparity between adversary parties: (1)
the cost of obtaining the transcript is commonly taxable in favor
of the prevailing party and hence ultimately recoverable by him if
the losing party is financially responsible; 33 (2) it is not always
necessary on appeal to use the entire transcript. Rules of appellate
courts commonly encourage the inclusion in the record of only
those portions of the testimony pertinent to questions raised on
appeal.3 4 For example, in a suit for damages for negligently caused
personal injuries, if the defendant who lost in the trial court wishes
to raise on appeal only questions pertinent to his alleged negligence,
there would be no occasion to procure those portions of the tran-
script . which contain medical testimony respecting plaintiff's in-
juries. Some courts already have reduced the requirements of print-
ing the record, 35 and further reforms tending to economy are doubt-
less likely, such as using off-set printing or other reproduction proc-
esses more economical than conventional printing.
31. Prior to 1944, see 58 Stat. 5 (1944), 28 U. S. C. § 9a (1946), there
was no statutory provision for government-paid court reporters in the United
States District Courts. The practice was for the parties by agreement to
engage a reporter. An impecunious defendant in a criminal case was much
handicapped in the preparation of the record for appeal; his Bill of Excep-
tions, in the absence of a verbatim transcript made available to him, had to be
made up ". . . from the judge's notes, from the recollection of witnesses...
and ... from any and all sources which will contribute to a veracious ac-
count. .. ." Miller v. United States, 317 U. S. 192, 198 (1942). Now, the
federal statutes require the reporter upon request of the judge to transcribe
the reporter's notes, 28 U. S. C. § 753(b) (1946) ; and authorize the court
in both civil and criminal cases to impose upon the United States the costs
of a transcript upon affidavit of a citizen that he is unable to pay -such
costs, 28 U. S. C. § 1915(b) (1946). See United States v. Sevilla, 174 F. 2d
879 (2d Cir. 1949).
32. See Desmond, Where Have the Litigants Gone?, 20 Ford. L. Rev.
229 (1951) ; Pirsig, The Work of the Supreme Court, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 821,
824 (1941).
33. Compare the general rule of non-taxability where the transcript is
procured for the convenience of counsel for use during the trial, and is not
furnished the court. Marshall v. Southern Pac. Co., 14 F. R. D. 228 (N.D.
Cal. 1953).
34. See, e.g., Rules of Practice of the Minnesota Supreme Court VIII,
2 (Nov. 1, 1946).
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VI. PROPOSALS FOR MECHANICAL RECORDATION
Various proposals have been made to substitute mechanical
techniques of recordation of trial proceedings for shorthand report-
ing. These proposals in part are based on the desirability of effecting
economies, and partly on the desirability of more accurately and
fully reproducing the trial and exposing nuances not recorded with
the written word. A recent innovation in Puerto Rico is provision
for mechanical sound recorders, the recorder being under the con-
trol of the trial judge who is able to turn it on and off by use of a
foot peddle30 While not fully informed on the details of this innova-
tion, the writers have heard complaints that it is deprecated
by the Bar, apparently in part for the reason that it puts the making
of the record at the discretion of the trial judge, thus obviating one
of the special values of the verbatim record as made by an inde-
pendent officer. Although not wishing to disparage experimentation
with mechanical means of preserving the trial, and envisaging the
possibility that such means may facilitate economical and more accu-
rate preservation, the writers venture to predict that mechanical in-
strumentalities will not displace the court reporter in American
practice but rather will be utilized by him in the execution of his
ultimate and independent responsibility of obtaining and preserving
the record.A7
35. See, e.g., Rules of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit 10(a) (Jan. 1, 1951) ; Rules of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit 17(a) (1952) which provides in part: "Unless
ordered by this court, it shall not be necessary to print the record on appeal
... , except that appellant shall print as a part of the appendix to his brief
the pertinent pleadings and pertinent docket entries, the judgment or order
appealed from..., together with any findings of fact, conclusions of law and
opinion or charge of the court ......
36. See Clark and Rogers, The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico, 61
Yale L. J. 1147, 1164 (1952) ; cf. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 809 (3d ed. 1940).
37. Cf. Rep. Judicial Conference of the U. S. 22, 23 (Sept. 1949). Ob-
serve that the Oklahoma statute quoted in note 1 supra, authorizes recording
by ".. . shorthand, stenotype, or such other method as may be approved by the
court and agreed to by all parties." But whatever the means used, the re-
cording remains the duty of the official court reporter.
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